During the November and December sessions, we were at the U.S. Embassy. I remember very well having sensational three-star meals, but being very dark. When we left for Christmas in 1972, we were at a dead end. We had tried to make it clear that we wanted to get to the bottom of it with the October agreement, but that we needed some changes, both in substance and in order to involve the Saigon government. But Hanoi had nothing to do with it. (a) The issue of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in southern Vietnam will be resolved by both South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles set out in paragraph (b) of Article 21 of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Vietnam of 20 July 1954, which is transformed as follows: the end of the war , the restoration of peace in Vietnam and the strict implementation of this agreement will create the conditions for the creation of a new agreement. , identical and mutually beneficial relations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the other and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other. At the same time, it will ensure a stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the maintenance of a lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Demining is carried out according to the priorities and dates agreed by both parties. To this end, representatives of both parties meet at an early stage to reach agreement on a program and implementation plan. ?? The objective is this: third, in the negotiations on this agreement, we negotiated the fate of South Vietnam.
Well, he said, you come to me a few weeks before your elections and you expect me to accept this agreement that will seal the fate of my country and my countrymen in a few days. He said that the agreement was wrong on principle and that it was also wrong in terms of perception, because the Americans put this agreement in my throat and ignored the fate of the South Vietnamese people. The colony had a ceasefire throughout Vietnam. In addition, the United States agreed to the withdrawal of all U.S. troops and advisors (approximately 23,700 in total) and the dismantling of all U.S. bases within 60 days. In exchange, the North Vietnamese agreed to release all American and other prisoners of war. From the implementation of the ceasefire to the formation of the government in accordance with Articles 9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties do not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers and military personnel, including technical military personnel, weapons, ammunition and war equipment in southern Vietnam. He chose all sorts of other languages that he considered weak in terms of international surveillance, supplies, the amount of aid or whatever. He complained about almost everything, but especially the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in southern Vietnam. Second, Thieu said he had been deceived. He said that this agreement went far beyond what we had brought to him and what he thought was ready for him.
With the reluctant adoption of Saigon, we initiated the agreement and returned to Paris on January 27, 1973 for the final signing. Kissinger stayed in Washington, and Foreign Minister [William] Rogers went to sign the agreement in Paris with the other foreign ministers.